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In the state of Sonora, the 2009 Hermosillo ABC Day Care Center fire and the
2014 Cananea copper mine spill highlighted how deregulation and divesti-
ture of state services by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and the
National Action Party (PAN) served the interests of a few elites, who main-
tained rule through mechanisms of impunity: in other words, through
actions undertaken without concern about the law or repercussions.
Although impunity produces a seemingly incoherent set of policy and poli-
tics, results from dozens of semi-structured interviews by our team also
suggest that exercising power through impunity is part of the culture of
governance in Mexico, relying on global ties, but not necessarily requiring
any specific individual or party leadership.
Key words: Corruption, disaster recovery, political economy, social justice,
victim compensation.
El incendio de la Guardeŕıa ABC de la Cd. de Hermosillo, Sonora en 2009, y
el derrame de la mina de cobre de Cananea, Sonora en 2014, exhibió la falta
de regulación estatal, aśı como la ineficiencia en materia de servicios
públicos durante las administraciones de los partidos poĺıticos del Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) aśı como del Partido Acción Nacional
(PAN), demostrando que finalmente están al servicio de los intereses de
pequeñas élites que mantienen y gobiernan a través de mecanismos de
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impunidad. Aunque la impunidad śı produce un conjunto de programas y
poĺıticas incoherentes, los resultados de más de 100 entrevistas semi-
estructuradas sugieren que, además, el ejercicio de poder mediante la impu-
nidad es parte de una cultura de gobernanza en México, que requiere
v́ınculos globales, pero no necesariamente requiere liderazgos espećıficos,
ya sean individuales o de partido.
Palabras clave: Compensación a v́ıctimas, corrupción, economı́a poĺıtica,
justicia social, recuperación de un desastre.
Introduction
The administration of the first ever PAN governor of the state of
Sonora, Guillermo Padrés Eĺıas, elected in July of 2009, was book-
ended by two disasters: a fire on June 5, 2009, in the ABC Day Care
Center in Hermosillo that killed forty-nine infants and toddlers and
sent dozens more to the hospital with injuries; and in August, 2014,
a major breach in one of the tailings ponds at the Buenavista del
Cobre mine, in Cananea, Sonora, that impacted residents along
250 kilometers of the Sonora River.1 Many attribute Padrés Eĺıas’
election to the populace being disappointed with the response of
the then PRI governor, Eduardo Bours Castelo, to the fire and also
to the fact that local PRI politicians were related to the day care’s
owners. The election for governor in Sonora occurred ten months
after the spill in 2014 and resulted in yet another change of political
party in the governor’s office. Many would say this change was a result
of the way local, state and national governments handled the spill.
Both events focused the public’s attention on matters of neolib-
eralism and impunity. First, despite promises to the contrary, the
neoliberal state of freer trade and government divestiture of industry
and services had enriched a privileged few; and, second, these events
reinforced the leaders’ approach of impunity, with a disregard for the
consequences of their actions regardless of party affiliation. We
1. Hereafter, we refer to the mine as the Cananea mine, since it has had different
owners and names over the past 100 plus years. Mining had been undertaken in the
area by the Pima Indians, later by the Jesuits, and since the mid-eighteenth century by
Mexicans and U.S. Americans artisanally mining gold and silver. What we know as the
Cananea copper mine was developed on lands and mines bought from General
Ignacio Pesqueira, and then opened in 1899 by U.S. company Greene Consolidated
Copper Company that was bankrupted by a 1906 strike, resulting, by 1913, in control
by the Anaconda Company. The government bought out Anaconda (maintaining
Atlantic Richfield as minority partner) in 1961. It was purchased by Mexicana de
Cobre (now part of Grupo México) in 1990.
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conceive of impunity as people being immune from punishment and
thus free to consciously act without concern for negative conse-
quence to themselves. Usually, it means that leaders are above the
rule of law. A rise in impunity during the 1980s and 1990s occurred
throughout Latin America, where sixteen countries passed amnesty
laws for former leaders who had affronted human rights (González
Ocantos 2012). Some have argued that the excessive displays of
impunity and the lack of concern for the public safety shown by local
state and federal officials in Mexico, particularly during the presiden-
cies of Felipe Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto, are being chal-
lenged, and that impunity is being moderated by new forces
(Romero y Parás, 2015; Casar, 2015). Examples of these new forces
include competition between political parties; greater freedom of the
press; spaces carved out by non-governmental organizations run by
social scientists; and the strengthening of international human rights
law and environmental laws that have allowed some legal response to
the Cananea mine spill (as discussed in this paper). In this paper we
demonstrate that actions, such as the recent and current investiga-
tions into nine former governors from all major parties (including
Sonoran governors Padrés Eĺıas,2 governor at the time of the Cananea
spill, and José Eduardo Robinson Bours Castelo, governor at the time
of the ABC fire), and the detention of major figures associated with
the ABC day care fire, do not actually represent an end to impunity,
but rather characterize a political system that is picking off individuals
in an effort to maintain its position of power and authority.
In this paper, we look at how the processes put in place and the
actions taken by the PRI and PAN governments did provide some
relief to those affected by these disasters, but how, in reality, they
served primarily to protect the ruling elite. In this study of political
anthropology, or, more specifically, this study of the anthropology of
governance, insights generated suggest that mechanisms for demon-
strating power and control are often the “fall back” position of oligar-
chic systems. Prioritizing the exercise of power through impunity can
generate robust continuity that does not require maintaining the
leadership of any specific individual or party, even though it
2. Padrés Eĺıas went into hiding in October 2015, and turned himself in a year
later in November 2016. He was jailed for fiscal fraud and the illegal transfer and use of
funds. He was absolved of several charges in February 2018, but remains in jail as of
June 2018, awaiting trial for a money laundering charge. During his administration, he
had also illegally damned a stream (Bacanuchi-Ŕıo Sonora tributary) to make an irri-
gation pond on his own property in the Ŕıo Sonora watershed, close to where the spill
mine occurred, and then blew up the damn when inspectors (from the opposition
party) had been instructed to confirm the damning was illegal.
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produces a seemingly incoherent set of policy and politics. The two
cases in this study show how the ability of those governing to main-
tain the governing structure depends as much (or more) on a well-
developed set of traditionally-employed techniques of governing, as
on the knowledge, ability, skill, or character of those doing the
governing. The impact of impunity on the people affected by it is
demonstrably similar in both cases, as are the practices of acting
without consequence that the governors and leaders employ in
generating those impacts.
The paper centers around two case studies of government
response to disaster. To discuss these we have divided the essay into
five sections: details about the two human-caused events; a frame-
work discussing state leadership in the face of disaster methodolo-
gies, findings, a discussion centering on the key dynamics of
impunity, and, finally, a conclusion that revisits the key challenges
for, and goals of, governments trying to maintain power when faced
by disasters. This paper is the result of continuous monitoring of the
response by the Governments of Mexico and Sonora to both the ABC
fire and the Cananea spill. The methods, discussed in more detail
later, included direct structured, semi-structured, and open-ended
interviews with victims, government officials, and key individuals
(such as academics, newspaper columnists, first responders, and reli-
gious leaders). The interviews were carried out in Spanish by the
authors. In addition, we monitored the major newspapers in
Sonora as well as national magazines and newspapers, such as
Proceso, La Jornada and Reforma. We also monitored reporting by
electronic media in Sonora. The conclusions are based on the
responses to the events by those in power and how citizens felt about
those responses as discussed by the authors and their students who
triangulated the impact of the two events.
The Two Case-Study Events
The ABC fire
As temperatures rose towards 100 degrees Fahrenheit under the
clear, cloudless midday sky on Friday, June 5, 2009, the people of
Hermosillo carried out their normal activities. Air conditioners and
water evaporative (swamp) coolers hummed, keeping much of the
citizenry comfortable in their offices and automobiles.
Hermosillo (capital city of Sonora) was, until the mid-1980s,
a slow-paced, medium sized city, whose economy depended on
government and agricultural services. Construction of the Ford
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Motor Company stamping and assembly plant in 1986, and the asso-
ciated infrastructure that follows such an industry, transformed the
city. Today, Hermosillo and much of the northern half of Sonora is
a major manufacturing center for the automobile and high-tech
industries, such as aerospace and medical devices. Much of this
production was and is geared to the United States and Canadian
markets but, with the expansion of the port at Guaymas, those in
power set their sights set on the emerging Pacific Rim Market. In
concert, the citizens of Hermosillo and of the broader state of
Sonora had begun to see themselves as part of a new democratic
Mexico with an important place to play on the world stage. The
historic ties to the United States through agriculture, mining and
trade were getting stronger and the citizens looked forward to a bright
liberal and democratic economic future.
Shortly before 3 p.m. on June 5 2009, smoke was seen rising
from a building in the southeastern portion of the city. The structure
housed the Guardeŕıa ABC (ABC Day Care Center), which was
owned by relatives of then-governor Bours.3 The fire eventually
claimed the lives of forty-nine of the approximately one hundred
and forty-nine children present and hospitalized at least forty others.
Care staff rushed to get children out of the building’s one exit, and
one care worker lost her own child to the blaze. News of the incident
swept Hermosillo, Sonora and the whole country like a shock wave.
By the next morning, newspapers in Hermosillo, in other Sonoran
cities, and in Mexico City, along with important news commentators
such as Carmen Aristegui, were demanding answers to questions:
How did the fire start? Who are the responsible parties? How could
the fire have been prevented? How can such tragedies be prevented
in the future?
Today, the terrible ABC Day Care Center fire—referred to as “la
tragedia” in Hermosillo—lingers in the minds of Hermosillo resi-
dents. Each year there is a commemorative parade and demonstra-
tion in Hermosillo. In addition, similar demonstrations occur in
places as disparate as Ciudad Obregón, Mexico City and Mérida.
Obviously, being the parent of a child who is killed or severely
injured is a devastating experience for any parent (Murphy et al.
1999, 2002). The death of a number of children by a single event
impacts an entire community in ways that have yet to be fully under-
stood by social scientists and others who seek to understand
such events.
3. The cost (2210 pesos per child) was covered by the national government social
and health insurance program. Parents paid into the program through their salary.
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The Cananea Spill
In early August of 2014, leaders from the village of Bacanuchi
arrived in the municipio capital Arizpe, a small town located at the
junction of the Ŕıo Bacanuchi and the Ŕıo Sonora/Bacoachi, with
tales of a rust-colored sludge that was flowing down the river. They
said they had traced it back to a breach in a damn holding back waste
sludge (including heavy metals) produced by the Buenavista del
Cobre mine in Cananea. The Cananea mine is Mexico’s largest—and
the world’s third largest—copper mine and lies some forty kilo-
meters from the United States–Mexico border at Nogales, Arizona.
Within days, the contamination reached Arizpe and continued to
flow down the Ŕıo Sonora past eight municipios, finally reaching
the small lake behind the Molino dam, approximately forty
kilometers north east of Hermosillo. Eventually, over 10 million
gallons of orange-colored copper sulfate were released into the
watershed. It affected two hundred fifty kilometers of the Rı́o
Sonora and directly or indirectly touched the lives of over 24,000
individuals who lived along the river or made their living from
goods produced along its banks.
The Cananea mine lies at the headwaters of three drainages: the
San Pedro Basin of the Colorado River; the Bacanuchi and Bacoachi
tributaries of the Ŕıo Sonora; and also the Concepción river water-
shed, which flows down into the Sonora Desert. Spills have occurred
at other times in the mine’s history. The fears of the U.S. government
of spills into the San Pedro River caused the mine owners to reconfi-
gure their tailing ponds towards the south and the Bacanuchi and
Bacoachi tributaries.4
The Cananea mine tailings pond spilled into the Bacanuchi
River on August 6, 2014, affecting more than forty villages in eight
municipalities5 along the Bacanuchi and Sonora Rivers. As this area
is deep in the Sonora desert, water access is always an issue, and
agriculture is heavily dependent on surface water supplemented by
agricultural wells.
Shortly after the leaders from the village of Bacanuchi had
reported the contamination of the Bacanuchi tributary of the Ŕıo
4. Despite these precautions, on September 21, 2014, a spill occurred into the
San Pedro River from the Cananea mine. The U.S. was not notified for two days of the
spill. Testing on the U.S. side did not show levels outside of normal once the water was
tested by the United States Geological Survey and the Arizona Department of
Environmental Quality (Porier 2015).
5. Cananea, Bacoachi, Arizpe, Banamichi, Huepac, San Felipe de Jesús, Aconchi,
Baviácora, Ures and Hermosillo.
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Sonora to the downriver leaders of the municipio of Arizpe (of which
they are part), the event was reported in the press, thus raising the
specter of heavy metal poisoning along the river as well as possible
contamination of food stuff produced in the region. Official proto-
cols established that an occurrence such as the Buenavista breach
and spill required two actions: 1) the closing of all water wells within
500 meters of the center line of the river; and 2) the prohibition of
the sale of all food stuffs produced using river or well water. In
announcing the closing of the river and wells, the government
implied they were doing so because of contamination by heavy
metals from the mine. People along the river were left with no access
to water for domestic consumption, irrigation or to sustain their
livestock.
In an effort to support the population, the state and federal
governments and Grupo México, the owners of the mine,6 organized
a fleet of tank trucks that delivered water to homes in the affected
area. In addition, the Comisión Nacional de Agua (CONAGUA)
brought in portable water purification plants. These drew water from
the wells, then ran the water through a purification process and
bottled it for domestic consumption. The water was ostensibly free
to those households and businesses whose water source had been
cut off, although it took time and energy and storage capacity to
receive the water until the government installed household water
tanks. For weeks after the event, water trucks roared up and down
routes 14 and 89 (La Ruta del Rı́o Sonora) from Hermosillo to
Cananea, delivering water to a population who wondered when they
would be able to re-open their wells for domestic use or irrigate their
fields from the river.
As with the ABC fire, this spill was also viewed as a tragedy. The
secretary of SEMARNAT (Secretaŕıa de Medio Ambiente y Recursos
Naturales)—the federal environmental agency—called this the worst
mine environmental disaster in Mexico’s history. Such tragedies are
made even more intense when they are seen to be the result of
human activity, either through negligence or greed (Wortman et al.
1997). “Acts of God” are accepted as the result of natural forces or
divine intervention. But, if the calamity is the result of—or made
much worse by—the greed of officials whose role is to protect the
public, but who cut corners or ignore warnings in order to increase
their power and or profits, then the impact feels much worse. A quest
6. Grupo México is the largest mining company and one of the largest copper
producers in the world. The CEO is Germán Larrea Mota-Velasco, who, according to
Forbes, is the second richest man in Mexico and number 72 in the world.
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for meaning in such an event is often converted into a quest for
justice. In the case of these two events, the quest for justice by the
people affected by the events leads to questions about the impunity
of those officials who are seen as responsible.
Conceptualizing the State
Anthropologists have long held that forms of government resem-
bling the state in complexity frequently act as if they are exempt
from consequence of their actions. However, it is clear that gover-
nance is rarely carried out in a monolithic or coherent fashion by
elites who all have similar agendas (e.g., Gupta 2012a, 2012b). In
this paper, we are focusing on two disasters to examine how the
agendas of leaders of various bureaucracies (and other elite leaders)
are expressed when greater chaos or less coherence appears likely.
In other words, we are interested in examining how extremely
unstable situations like disasters produce specific challenges to
governance; and to what degree there is uniformity (and variation)
in the responses of leaders and other state officials in extreme
settings like disasters. While hazards are defined as the risky events
that a populace might face, it is our social hierarchies, governmental
policies, and investments that create vulnerabilities that put people
and physical infrastructure in harm’s way to produce disastrous
consequences (Garcia Acosta 2002).
When the actions of non-state actors (for example, non-
governmental organizations, student groups, and civic clubs)
become unpredictable or unstable—as in post-disaster situations
like the two under discussion—some leaders attempt to increase
their own control, while other leaders employ abandonment or
negligence (see, for example, Goldstein 2016). Often, existing state
programs or institutions cooperate rather than compete when faced
with the challenges of disasters and other extreme events. In the
case of the Cananea mine spill, two bodies converged to create
a commission: CONAGUA, as part of SEMARNAT, and the
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México (UNAM). They coop-
erated in the creation of a commission charged with ameliorating
the impact of the disaster and determining when the water was safe
to use again.7 The arrangement allowed SEMARNAT to support its
7. In January 2015, article authors Luque and Murphy were invited to participate
in a meeting organized by researchers from the Instituto de Geoloǵıa at UNAM for the
purposes of coordinating research and providing feedback to SEMARNAT.
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activities with scientific impartiality provided by one of Mexico’s
leading public universities.8
Anthropology and Impunity
At the heart of this study is the notion of impunity. Our main concep-
tualization of impunity is that individuals or small groups of people—
elected state leaders, in this case—are immune from punishment and
thus free to consciously act without concern about negative conse-
quence to themselves. However, this concept proves insufficient
when we try to account for the fact that leaders very often act in such
a way that brings about their own downfall. An analytically powerful
concept of impunity, then, seems to us to require not only a sense of
license and a lack of fear of reprisal, but additionally a sense of justi-
fication of both a governmental body’s symbolic encompassment of
society and the governmental body’s symbolic verticality. Ferguson
and Gupta (2002) have discussed the metaphor of the spatialized
state, and noted how it is used by scholars and members of civil
society to describe the relationships between state actors (for
example, police, elected officials, heads of state agencies) and non-
state actors, with the state at the center or core and non-state actors as
peripheral. As Ferguson and Gupta (2002) point out, anthropologists
have focused on how national and provincial governing structures
impact local communities, and how government offices use symbolic
devices (for example, insignias, endorsements/ sanctions, appear-
ances by leaders, unnecessary paperwork/ rules) to maintain the
state’s imagined and privileged relationship to civil society. Much
of the focus is on two ways in which national government actors (for
example, agencies, departments) tend to expand and secure their
legitimacy and authority: 1) by presenting symbols of their superi-
ority over the governed (sitting on a dais, wearing “official” shirts and
other clothing and, most commonly, making the “other” wait, in
other words a form that could be conceptualized through a notion
of verticality); and 2) by finding opportunities to present symbols of
an agency’s relevance to more and more domains of life. This is the
process of encompassment—by which an agency of the government
uses an event such as the fire or the derrame to expand its reach into
people’s homes, work, and community. It may even extend to the
8. Efforts by the SEMARNAT/UNAM committee to coordinate with local academics,
for example La Universidad de Sonora (UNISON), el Centro de Investigación en
Alimentación y Desarrollo (CIAD), and public entities such as the state water agency,
were not as successful.
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wider community and region if conditions, such as water pollution
and scarcity (e.g., Anagnost 1997; Ferguson and Gupta 2002).9
According to Ferguson and Gupta, to maintain this dual sense of
illusion of relevance and superiority, state entities undertake various
symbolic actions and rituals (such as visits by political and adminis-
trative figures, national symbols such as the flag, and placed news
stories supporting the government’s actions), to maintain the image
of comprehensive beneficence or generosity, while at the same time
protecting and producing hierarchy (Ferguson and Gupta 2002).
Benevolence is one mechanism for being relevant, especially if the
benevolence can be symbolized to protect hierarchy, as in the case of
providing water tanks for homes along the Rı́o Sonora or desig-
nating a special location for the burial of the lost children in the
city’s cemetery.
In the context of tragedy and disaster, state agencies are pressed
into the tenuous position of employing these symbolic activities on
behalf of non-state elite actors (for example, bankers, investors, and
industrialists). These elite non-state actors have most benefited from
the development of the global neo-liberal governing strategy of negli-
gence and abandonment. Negligence and abandonment is the
general abdication of the state’s responsibility for the welfare of
a population, and is a governing strategy that ironically tends to
reduce governmental bodies’ capacities to effectively employ benev-
olence symbolically and thus both remain relevant to society and
remain above society. This strategy also overemphasizes symbols of
authority through reliance on actions harmful to the populace.
Governance Challenges in the Face of Disasters
Disasters are a kind of focusing event that bring people’s attention to,
among other things, public policy and its implications. Potentially
incongruent agendas of various state bodies might be highlighted
by such focusing events. But a focusing event can just as easily
present the possibility that traditional agendas are sidelined or even
buried. Birkland (2013, 2006, 1996) and Penrose (1999) identified
conditions in which goals of broader participation and improved
quality of life have a better chance in disaster settings. They found
that direct policy change is more likely in events where a specific
proximal cause is identified (such as aviation disasters) or where
9. For details of the use of symbols by those in power to control others, see
Anderson 1991; Bernal 1997; Cohn 1996; Comaroff 1998; Coronil 1997; Geertz 1980;
Joseph and Nugent 1994; Nugent 1997; Scott 1998; and Taussig 1996.
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presumed lapses in security or policy are defined and may be “fixed”
(such as in the case of terrorism). On the other hand, events with less
well-defined responsibility (such as natural disasters) may lead to
only incremental policy changes, or even to none at all.
This focusing nature of disasters is particularly salient in recent
studies that find disaster risk reduction is not achieved as much by
mitigation, response, and recovery as it is by addressing the root
causes of disaster-particularly unsustainable development and
vulnerability (Oliver-Smith 2009, Wisner et al. 2004). Following these
scholars, this study of impunity follows two disasters in the state of
Sonora, Mexico, for which we have sought to identify political root
causes. The framework of Wisner and colleagues suggests that the
relationship between the root causes of vulnerability (such as a lack
of resources and power) and the hazardous pressures generated by
this vulnerability is mediated by policy-making. Thus, one way of
summarizing their heuristic research framework is to say that vulner-
ability emerges from social and political inequality (typically
supported by a related ideology), but disasters are generated by both
the enactment of the policies and the neglect of the policies them-
selves. With government policies that are effective and well imple-
mented, inequality will be less likely to turn a hazard into a disaster in
terms of both impact and recovery.
The challenge to governance that is generated by the interaction
of hazard vulnerability with government policies—particularly privat-
ization and other neoliberal policies—might be mitigated in many
disaster settings by what is called disaster capitalism, defined as prof-
iting from the needs and vulnerability of people in these dire situa-
tions (Klein 2007. Various articles in Gunewardena and Schuller 2008
and Oka et al. 2009 referred to it as disaster mercantilism when
referring to periods prior to capitalist world system). In some cases,
profiteers control every aspect of the recovery setting; in other cases,
the profit margins are small and people continue to struggle to
recover although that recovery is not controlled by the insertion of
atypical enterprises. In the cases of the ABC fire and the Cananea spill,
we will see that a relatively minor amount of profiteering occurred:
the water delivery trucking companies along the Ŕıo Sonora indeed
benefited hugely for a short time, and it is possible that a few of the
lawyers in the ABC fire purposefully engaged in profiteering.
Divide and Conquer with Deservingness
We define efficient and effective government in disaster settings
as providing timely and appropriate support to vulnerable people.
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A governing body’s twist on this expectation via encompassment and
verticality is the politics of deservingness, in which government
bodies seek fair and effective government more in letter (and symbol)
than in deed (Kroll-Smith 2018, chapter 5). In the book The Best of
Times, The Worst of Times, Susanna Hoffman (1999) discusses the
politics of deservingness in the wake of the Oakland Fire, where
people competed for access to aid, using different markers to build
their case about who is or is not deserving of aid (see also Barrios
2014, Faas 2015).
Employing an analysis of reciprocity between individuals and
an institution providing post-disaster resources, Faas (2014, 2015)
examined not only the ways in which the benefactor sought to
identify deservingness, but also how beneficiaries actively helped
form the expectations around, and participation in, recovery efforts
that involved the distribution of resources to individuals or house-
holds affected by the Mt Tungurahua, Ecuador, eruptions of 2006
and 1999:
In 2008 and 2009, several years after the last great eruptions, displaced
villagers often contested the distinctions between those deemed “deserving”
and “undeserving” of aid in the form of housing, relief goods, and program
inclusion by contrasting their suffering with that of others. Since I had only
just begun fieldwork, I did not anticipate the relative importance of the times
and spaces of the initial disaster events and evacuation processes in marking
these domains of suffering and, hence, deservingness. When households
from one village were perceived to be deprived of a form of aid, a typical
rejoinder was “everyone from [some other village] receives houses and aid
and they never suffered the way we did!” (Faas 2015:251).
Forging Wellbeing among Disaster and Impunity
As highlighted by Faas, disaster victims do not just wait around to be
acted upon by state and non-governmental institutions. In research
on the ABC fire, Jones and Murphy (2015) have begun to explore
how such agency by families affected by the fire—specifically by
engaging in social justice activities and movements—is implicated
in their post-disaster wellbeing i.e., those participating more in
social justice are those with more depression, post-traumatic stress,
and complex grief symptoms.
The question that emerges for us (in addition to the possibility
that people with worse pain feel a greater need to do something
about it) is whether it is the stress and focus on the past through
justice-seeking that is responsible for greater mental health issues
or whether it is post-disaster impunity by governmental bodies
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and wealthy non-state elite actors that further jeopardizes well-
being. The consequences of the latter (post-disaster impunity) is
exhibited in the post-Exxon Valdez Spill. Two decades of legal
maneuvers and impunity by Exxon (Picou et al. 2004) was corrosive
to community cohesions in the post-disaster environment
(Freundenberg and Jones 1991).
Methodology
To generate data to approach our questions, we relied on a combina-
tion of ethnographic, survey, governmental, and newspaper data.
Our methods closely resemble the Community Participatory
Involvement (CPI) model as described by Whiteford and Vindrola-
Padros (2015:62). The CPI model works within the methodological
framework of ethnography. It relies heavily on understanding indivi-
duals and their communities (and how gender and power shape
those experiences). It also relies on understanding how macro-level
institutional structures (such as regional or global events) shape poli-
cies that become translated into programs and practices.
Study Design for the ABC Fire
In 1999, Murphy and Fran Norris began to lay the foundation for
a long-term study of stress, trauma and post-disaster recovery in
Mexico. The initial phase consisted of an epidemiological study of
stress levels in four cities that had not suffered a major catastrophe in
recent memory. The project used random sampling in the applica-
tion of stress, trauma and PTSD portions of the Composite
International Diagnostic Interview instrument developed by the
World Health Organization (1997) to assess mental health problems.
Over 2500 people participated in those epidemiological interviews in
the cities of Oaxaca, Guadalajara, Mérida, and Hermosillo (Norris
et al. 2001, 2005; Norris 2012).10
The epidemiology of stress and trauma in urban Mexico, parti-
cularly in Hermosillo, provided the foundation needed to seek
funding from the National Institute of Mental Health for a RAPID
grant (NIH grant R21MH090703) to study the long-term effects of
the fire on parents at the ABC Day Care Center. The first wave of the
study began in January of 2010 and ended in early May of the same
10. The study, carried out with colleagues from the departments of psychology
and urban studies at the University of Guadalajara, was funded by a grant from NIH
(RO1 MH51278).
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year. This new project involved interviews with 226 parents and care-
takers from 95 of the 134 families affected by the fire. These families
represented 106 of the 162 children who were at the day care center
on the day of the fire. The research team carried out structured
psychological and social network interviews to understand how grief
varied among the different categories of people associated with the
event (males vs. females, mothers vs. fathers, parents vs. caretakers,
parents of deceased vs. parents of injured). Of interest was how
people differed in their response to complicated grief—that is grief
lasting longer than six months (Prigerson et al. 2009). A second wave
of structured interviews took place between January and April, 2011.
In addition to the structured interviews, members of the team
conducted semi-structured interviews with parents, caretakers, and
citizens associated with the event. These interviews were wide
ranging covering the event itself; people’s reactions to the event; and
their efforts to organize, and the search for justicia. We also reviewed
government and judicial reports, the Supreme Court’s ruling,
forensic reports, news reports, and academic reports as they relate
to the fire and its aftermath. Murphy returned to carry out interviews
in 2010, 2012, 2013, and in 2014–2015.11 The goal was to under-
stand, in greater depth, what had happened in the intervening four
years, as parents (individually and as part of a group) had struggled
for justice and with their own internal divisions.
It became clear to us early in our interviews that, in addition to
justicia, the question of impunity was also foremost on the agenda of
at least one of the organized groups. The fact is that for them these
two concepts are linked. For many, justice became defined as seeing
those they considered responsible thrown in jail. Thus, the high
percentage of people who were not jailed or brought before the
courts represented another example of impunity on the part of the
political and economic elite. As we began to investigate the impact of
the copper sulfate spill along the Ŕıo Sonora, we saw the same
pattern of impunity emerge: in the case of the ABC fire, impunity
of the owners of the center and those who were responsible for
11. In 2014, Murphy received a Fulbright-Garcia Robles award from COMEXUS to
serve as a Senior Research Fellow in the department of Desarrollo Regional at the
Centro de Investigaćıon en Alimentación y Desarrollo (CIAD) in Hermosillo. The
purpose of the project was to complete intensive open-ended interviews with parents,
non-parents, first responders and officials in order to better understand, how the
various groups organized themselves; how their social networks might impact their
ability to receive what they considered to be justicia and to enable some measure of
closure around the event. The Cananea mine tailings pond spill occurred days after
Murphy’s arrival in Hermosillo.
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regulating day care centers; and, in the case of the Cananea spill,
impunity of the owners of the mine and state and federal inspectors
responsible for overseeing mine safety.
Study Design for the Cananea Spill
We were invited to study the Cananea mine spill by colleagues in
Hermosillo and Mexico City (Luque et al. 2015). We conducted two
sets of interviews to understand people’s perceptions of the
problems and how they have interacted with others in their
recovery.12 The first was with official and key informants in seven of
the eight affected municipalities (minus Hermosillo); and the second
focused on farmers and other residents (114 interviews in 23 affected
communities) along the Ŕıo Sonora and its tributaries (See Figure 1).
Approximately two months (October, 2014) after the discovery of
the contamination of a tributary of the Rı́o Sonora, a team of
researchers from CIAD traveled to the region to conduct a rapid
assessment of conditions and to study how the event had affected
the economic and socio-psychological wellbeing of the region. The
goal of the assessment was to interview approximately 30 individuals
including: community leaders, small business owners, farmers, and
wage laborers. The sample was purposeful in that we looked for
community leaders, small business owners, farmers and wage
laborers, where possible, in order to get an overall view of the impact,
but at the same time the sample was opportunistic, in that we did not
turn down anyone who wished to speak with us about their
experiences.
Typically, we interviewed people by going house to house in
different parts of a village. The maximum number of houses per
village was six and the minimum was one. Two of the communities
in which we carried out interviews were not directly affected by the
copper sulfate spill from the Cananea mine and therefore serve some-
what as a control sample. However, it is fair to say that, although they
were not directly affected, the indirect impact was severe due to road
blockages and difficulty marketing their products. In one case, for
example, a rancher from Bacoachi—a community on a tributary of
the Ŕıo Sonora not affected by the spill—told us they were having
trouble selling their yearling cattle because potential buyers from
feedlots both in the United States and Mexico were nervous about
12. Support for this research came from the National Center for the Study of
Hazards and Disasters, CONACYT, and a research leave from the College of Arts and
Sciences of the University of North Carolina at Greensboro.
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purchasing cattle they might not be able to butcher in the future.
Comments like this during our interviews plus reports from the press
make it clear that the entire Ŕıo Sonora watershed from Cananea to
Hermosillo was affected—if not directly by the chemical and heavy
Figure 1. The green border of the map shows the area of influence of the
copper sulfate spill that occurred in August 2014 in the state of Sonora in
northwest Mexico. The Sonora River and its tributaries are in dark blue,
flowing from the north at the Cananea mine spill site. Along the river are dots
representing the wells and irrigation gates. Listed are the communities of the
zone, and the seven municipalities along the river are outlined in beige.
Source: Luque et al., 2015.
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metal solution, then certainly by the social and economic stigma
attached to the spill. This is similar to what happened to the
Alaskan fishing industry after the Exxon Valdez oil spill (Dyer 1993,
2002, 2009), the algae bloom in western Lake Erie, and Mad Cow
scare in western Canada (Smart and Smart 2009), to name a few (for
other examples, see Jones and Murphy 2009).
In both the ABC fire and Cananea spill studies, the interview
instrument was based on that used by the “International Disaster
Response and Recovery Project” in the United States, Mexico and
Ecuador (e.g., Norris et. al 2001, Jones et. al 2013). The instrument
consists of a series of demographic questions, followed by questions
pertaining to the impact of the event on individual and household
daily activity and economic wellbeing. It asks about social networks,
and the information and support received through these networks,
and includes a series of questions on physical and mental health that
come from published scales (Leventhal et al. 1996; WHO 1997;
Radloff 1977; Tobin, et al. 2014).
Findings
One of the more striking findings in this comparative study of these
two disasters in Sonora was how often victims of the Cananea mine
disaster indicated symptoms like those experienced by parents who
had lost children in the ABC fire (Figure 2). Parents who lost children
and Cananea victims experienced: difficulty sleeping, depression,
trouble concentrating, and a loss of pleasure in activities that they
had found enjoyable in the past.
Most importantly, perhaps, for the future of both groups—and
particularly concerning State efforts to re-engage residents to recover
from the disasters—is the high proportion of these residents who had
lost faith in the future (see item 2, Figure 2). The loss of faith in the
future by Ŕıo Sonora residents was surprisingly higher than that of
parents who lost children in the ABC Day Care fire. However, their
loss of faith in the future was not as high as those parents whose
children had been injured in the ABC Day Care fire. Thus, people’s
faith in the future is impacted not only by government response, but
also by the kind of specific impact the disaster had on people.
In effect, this loss of faith in the future is related to a loss of trust
in those governing to be responsive to people’s needs. Based on our
interviews, we saw that a lack of faith in the future was closely tied to
calls for justice and to demands for an end to impunity. This does not
mean that everyone who had less faith in the future was motivated to
speak out, march or attend meetings. Many people who spoke of
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little hope for the future also expressed resignation about the govern-
ment’s behavior and felt powerless; thus, they did not participate in
calls for social justice. Still, a loss of faith in the future appeared to be
tied to a lack of trust in government.
Prior negative experiences with the government or its agents
were the norm for those who we interviewed, and, as Birkland
(2013) points out, events such as these tend to focus people’s atten-
tion on policies. While people might trust or might not trust govern-
ments before a disaster, governmental emergency and recovery
actions following a disaster could generate trust. Indeed, the media
will impact unaffected people’s perceptions, but victims directly see
the response of government and even the response of experts—and
victims evaluate that response in relation to their own needs.13











Figure 2. The graph compares the percentage of each sample population
affected by the psychological symptoms. The first ABC sample (n¼98) is of
parents and caretakers at 8-11 months post-fire whose children were killed by
the fire. The second ABC sample (n¼126) is of parents and caretakers 8-11
months post-fire whose children experienced the fire but did not die. The Rio
Sonora sample (n¼114) is of adults 8 months post-spill who continued to live
in the area and represent all seven municipalities along the river.
13. Independent Study on Best Practices, Including Recommendations, to Assist
States in Strengthening their Domestic Capacity to Combat All Aspects of Impunity, by
Professor Diane Orentlicher, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2004/88, p. 2 (27 February 2004). The
Updated Set of principles for the protection and promotion of human rights through
action to combat impunity comprise thirty-eight principles. See UN Doc. E/CN.4/2005/
102/Add.1 (8 February 2005).
Jones, Luque, Murphy, Recovering Impunity 235
For both disasters, this loss of faith in the future can be linked to
how authorities handled the situation and its aftermath, and the
people’s specific concerns, as we discuss below. For parents whose
children died, although they may maintain a distrust of the govern-
mental response, their child’s death is final and so a faith in the future
is probably not tied as much to governmental actions. Additionally,
the mothers received a pension for the rest of their lives. For the
parents whose children were injured, there was no pension, plus
there was no sense of finality and they were concerned for the future
health of their children. They were not convinced that, just because
a child was released from the hospital, the child would be free of
future health problems related to the fire. A parent, who sat clutching
a squirming victim, described:
My child used to run all the time. Now he can’t run around the house once.
How do I know that in the future he will not have something wrong with his
lungs that will keep him from working?
ABC fire parent (Murphy 2012 field notes, translation).
A general mistrust of the government health care system has not
fostered trust between the medical authorities (who suggest that
children’s symptoms will diminish with time) and the care takers
(who see dramatic behavioral changes in the children). This mistrust
is not helped by a tendency among Instituto Mexicano del Seguro
Social (IMSS) and other state-employed physicians to encourage
parents to take their children to their private offices where they will
receive more “personal” attention. In light of the fact that the chil-
dren’s health care would be taken care of by the government for the
rest of their lives, these parents’ vision of the future conceivably could
change and become more positive and involve more trust in medical
experts, but, clearly, this trust would have to be diligently earned by
medical professionals given the general distrust of promises about
the futures of their children.
For those along the river, uncertainty came when the authorities
declared the river and wells to be free of contamination, after these
water sources had been officially closed for about three months by
CONAGUA. This came after many people had drunk water from
wells and from the river and municipal water in the first days after
the spill, because the mine had not reported the event and agencies
had not reacted immediately. The original handling of the event was
marred by a lack of clear information to residents; by squabbling
between local, state and federal authorities; and by conflicting
stories in the media, such that residents were confused and
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frightened about the future. More important to many riverine resi-
dents was how the story was playing out among friends and family
who no longer lived in the area, but who in the past visited on
a regular basis but had stopped “coming home” in fear of the effects
on their own children.
In discussions of the impact of the disaster on land, animals
and crops, one of the interviewees wanted to express the worst
consequence:
My daughter says she is not going to bring her children here. She is afraid of
the water and the contaminants in the sediment and sand, and the sickness
they might cause in my grandchildren. I fear I will never see my grand-
children play here again.
Farmer/rancher along the Ŕıo Sonora (Murphy field notes 2015, translation).
This expression of concern for the future, and especially concerning
impacts on family and social relationships, was one we heard over
and over in our semi-structured open interviews. The connection
between social relationships and this faith in the future happened,
for some people, through their hope for social justice, coupled with
their actions of protest along with other people. Here, the degree to
which faith in social justice would be fomented by trust in govern-
ment was eventually undermined by the impunity of the state and
local elites as they sought to disempower the victims.
Recovering Impunity
Scrutiny
In their own way, both events brought into question the neoliberal
path of economic development that Mexico forged upon entering
into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the subsequent
negotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement. During the
administration of Carlos Salinas (1988–1994), the Mexican State
began an aggressive program to privatize state assets in services,
banking and industry. Often—as in the case of the railroads, mines,
and telecommunications—state assets were declared bankrupt by the
state and sold off at a fraction of their worth. Grupo México
purchased many of the state’s mining interests, including the
Cananea mine, which they renamed Buenavista del Cobre.14
14. They subsequently formed the subsidiary Southern Copper Company in
Phoenix, Arizona.
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On a national level, the sale of these assets created some of the
largest fortunes in the world. At the local level, many family members
of the home-town elite were given access to business opportunities at
a fraction of their value: for example, when IMSS began the process of
privatizing its day care services, many of the franchises went to the
family members of local politicians and elites. The failure of existing
safety measures at the Cananea mine and at ABC Day Care Center
(owned by powerful local elites) raised questions of impunity and
whether or not the eyes of officialdom had turned the other way to
profit influential families. While government ownership of assets in
Mexico has often been accompanied by corruption or impunity,
privatization as a new modality of oligarchy in Mexico—replacing
state oligarchy—seems to have gone alongside greater failures in
safety, and this handover of state assets to elites appears to increase
risk through a path of reduced attention to worker and citizen well-
being—in this case an integral aspect of the practice of impunity.
In the wake of both events, individuals and groups attempted to
reach out to others in their search for justicia—a kind of social justice
foment wherein appropriate overtures are eventually made by the
state to appease claimants. The people’s political activity was
directed toward making sure these sorts of events never happen
again, also at identifying those responsible for the catastrophes, and
seeking compensation for current and future damages.15 In the case
of both disasters, the issue of culpability loomed large for the local,
state, and national powerful elites, as elections happened to occur
shortly after each extreme event. In the case of the ABC fire, elections
a month after the fire resulted in the first PAN victories in the history
of the Sonoran governorship—after over eighty years of rule by the
PRI. In the case of the Cananea mine spill, residents and civil society
pointed toward the nation’s strong Environmental Responsibility
Law to support the creation of a compensation fund created by
Grupo México and administered by the Mexican government.
SEMARNAT declared the spill the worst environmental disaster in
Mexico’s mining history. The scrutiny that was focused on the region
revealed irregularities not only in the management risks associated
with the mine, but also in the way in which concessions for water
were granted to members of the state oligarchy and high officials in
both major parties.
15. This is not unlike what was reported for Buffalo Creek, Love Canal, Exxon
Valdez, 9/11, and the BP Gulf blow out (see, for example, Erickson 1972, Schneider &
McCumber 2004, Everest 1986, Brown & Mikkelsen 1990, Raphael 1986).
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The two disasters focused attention on, and exposed weaknesses
in, the existing socio-political structure (Birkland 2006), requiring
the state apparatus to swing into action to ensure that elites and the
state structure were both reinvigorated and also escaped harm (see
Boin 2008).
A mechanism for returning power to the state even in non-
disaster settings is a purposeful ambiguity that permits the enforce-
ment of certain norms or expectations to some but not others, so that
people can be strategically punished or rewarded (e.g., Goldstein
2016). Compensation can be one important state tactic for using
rewards to support the exercise of impunity.
Compensation and Division
Under such circumstances, it is important for the state and the elite to
recognize an event, to ensure that it is seen as an aberration outside
of normality, and then to isolate those affected in a manner that
diminishes their political effectiveness.16 A common way of accom-
plishing this is through compensation. In both disasters, the Mexican
State established methods of compensation for those affected. An
aberration outside of normality—such as a disaster—can, from
a government’s perspective, effectively be resolved with compensa-
tion, even though the Mexican environmental responsibility law
includes the concept of “irreversible and irremediable damage.”
Generally, the ethics of impunity work in the following ways: first,
by explaining away the event to victims and the public—often
through a creative interpretation of scientific reports—; and, second,
by appearing to make things right in the eyes of enough victims so
that they appear to the public to have effected some kind of recovery.
Finally, with the attention of the public on the victims and their
supposed recovery, it is generally fine in the eyes of the state to see
to it that the victims begin to divide over purpose and strategy. The
politics of deservingness is a typical way the victims begin to divide
(see also Hoffman 1999, Barrios 2014). As one villager told us: “They
created the mine spill trust fund to make us more disorganized, and
they succeeded.” We have previously cited the example of Faas
(2014) in relation to disaster survivors. In that study, Faas noted that
whenever they perceived a lack of equality, the victims clamored:
“Everyone from [some other village] receives houses and aid and they
never suffered the way we did!”
16. A good discussion of this process can be found in Steinberg (2000).
Jones, Luque, Murphy, Recovering Impunity 239
In the case of the ABC fire, parents were provided with a one-time
monetary compensation by the government. In addition, injured
children were guaranteed, through IMSS, lifetime medical benefits
regardless of their employment status. Mothers of injured children
were provided with a life-long pension equal to the minimum salary
of a person in the occupation they held at the time of the fire. In the
case of the Cananea spill, the State used funds supplied by Grupo
México to quickly establish a trust fund of approximately 150 million
dollars, to be managed by the government, for remediation along 250
kilometers of river and to compensate those of the 24,000 residents
along the river who had lost income due to the spill. Compensation
was based on the number of cattle an individual lost—up to $100,000
pesos total, and $10,000 pesos per hectare for agricultural land taken
out of production. In addition, there was a program to compensate
merchants whose businesses had been negatively impacted by the
spill and to compensate home owners who lost access to water.
Compensation, however, is a double-edged sword. No one
doubted, or doubts today, that parents from the fire or victims of the
Cananea spill disaster deserved some compensation for their loss.
However, once the money and medical attention were made avail-
able, it began to cause divisions among the victims and between
victims and the public, plus compensation shifted the focus from
social justice to individual appeasement. The ABC parents divided
along lines of whether or not they should accept the compensation
vs. whether they should hold out until those responsible were
brought before a criminal proceeding as well as get actual change
in the governance of child welfare.17 Along the Rı́o Sonora, the
process of compensation was put in the hands of an independent
commission, thus allowing Grupo México to distance itself from the
process. The process to be used to distribute the Cananea spill funds
pit the reparations commission against various local authorities (who
wanted to maintain their own positions of structural control) and
against citizens who felt they were not adequately compensated for
their loss and who suspected that their local officials were guilty of
corruption and collusion with Grupo México.
The payment of compensation, or the promise thereof, was not
only hush money, but also led to an erosion of the moral authority of
the victims (Adeola & Picou 2012, Fothergill 2003), while at the same
17. The Act for the Provision of Holistic Care and Development of Infants was
passed in late 2011 as a result of the fire and of the efforts of some parents and members
of civil society, but this law regulating child care is only as good as the enforcement that
governments will give it.
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time providing the elite (and the State) with the power to claim the
moral high ground. It was not long before the public began to ques-
tion the moral authority of the parents from the ABC fire and, six
years later, the victims of the Ŕıo Sonora disaster. Stories began to
circulate in the press of mothers who were working again even
though they received a pension to stay home with their injured child;
or, of some parents who had taken the funds—provided by the
“benevolent” state, which supposedly bore little or no responsibility
for the fire—and purchased new homes and automobiles. Along the
Ŕıo Sonora, stories abounded of fraudulent claims to the special
compensation fund. The accusations were that people (including
local leaders) had made claims when they were not affected; that
people had claimed losses far in excess of their possible net worth;
and that government officials had siphoned off some of the funds.18
The effect was to stigmatize reparations and compensation and thus
convert reparations from something people were owed for having
their human rights violated, to something given by the state/elite as
charity to those injured (Fothergill 2003, Adeola and Picou 2012); in
other words, charity provided for them by the paternalistic oligarchy
in response to a lamentable but out-of-the-ordinary event. In the end,
compensation diminished the people’s political effectiveness. And as
soon as the money flowed, the political effectiveness stopped—which
caused more division and accusations that some people got helped
while others did not. With only about one third of the funds spent
that were set up in the Cananea spill trust fund (Fideicomiso), the
company Grupo México said they finished with the recovery process
in 2015. Government acceptance of ending the recovery trust fund’s
work, however, received a strong response from the civil sector. At
the time of this manuscript going to press, the Supreme Court was
taking up the case.
Finally, in the case of the mine spill, this compensation has also
been examined for another of its effects—the distribution of wealth.
The Department of Agriculture, Fish and Aquaculture provides
considerable subsidies to larger farmers and agroindustry enter-
prises. The compensation plan set up for the mine spill was based
on this system of support for industrial agriculture. While there was
a limit of $100,000 (U.S. dollars) for total value of cattle herd per
owner, there was no limit on the number of hectares that were
18. Of note were the rumors of street vendors who, in exchange for a portion of
the funds extracted from the trust, loaned their damaged business equipment to indi-
viduals who then used the equipment to prove their loss and the case of farmers who
claimed to have lost more land to the flood than they had registered for tax purposes.
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indemnified per owner. Thus, the mine spill recovery was an instru-
ment, inadvertent or not, of increasing rural wealth disparities.
Conclusion
The root causes of most disasters are political economic (Wisner
et al. 2004), in other words, how the leaders’ governance strategies
intersect with people’s vulnerabilities. In this case, the root causes
specifically lie with the privatization of public goods and services
without concomitant regulation. Oliver-Smith (2009) has built upon
the understandings of Wisner et al., thus prodding scholars and
policy makers to look at risk reduction less as a matter of mitigation,
response and recovery, and more as a matter of addressing the
goals of unsustainable development and growth as the root causes
of disaster.
Disasters are of concern to modern states and oligarchies
because they expose both the inability of the state to protect citizens
and also the weaknesses of the ruling elites (Araújo 2014). This is
particularly the case if a regime is in crisis—as evidenced in events
such as the 1976 earthquake in Guatemala (Bates 1982), the 1985
Earthquake in Mexico City (Poniatowska 1988), and the 2004
Christmas tsunami (Gamburd 2014). The state will intensify the
effects of the crisis as leaders serve to draw away the unwanted atten-
tion of the citizenry and media. These focusing events can be impor-
tant opportunities for new input and even change in the policy
process (Birkland 2006). However, under such conditions, it
becomes incumbent on the power structure to ensure the population
believes in the uniqueness of the event and its aftermath. That is to
say that the event could not have been predicted and that, given the
un-predictability of the event, the state is doing all it can to mitigate
the impact and return things to the ante crisis state of affairs—thus
obviating the need for change in the process of politics.
In the cases of both the Cananea spill and the ABC fire, the cause
of the disasters were proximal and specific, and there were lapses in
security and policy that could later be fixed, thus qualifying these
disasters as good candidates for generating policy changes. But policy
hasn’t changed much. With the fire, a national child care act sought
both greater regulations and the enforcement of existing regulations.
However, the enactment of the law is meager. Several individuals
were also prosecuted but only nine low rank workers are in jail,
whereas high rank persons were able to defend their cases. The
ABC case was treated by the national Supreme Court of Justice, which
decided that there were serious human rights violations and did
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order an investigation of the facts around the responsibilities of
public authorities. With the spill, as per the environmental responsi-
bility law, a fine was leveled at Grupo México, but no one was pros-
ecuted. Several months after the spill, there were some non-violent
protests against government decisions, and the leaders of those
protests were sent to a preventive jail. The planned number of water
processing plants has dropped to 7 from 29, and 750 million pesos is
still unspent out of the original fine of 2 billion pesos, three years
after the event—prompting the people to sue Grupo México in the
Supreme Court. The impunity cases from these two disasters are just
a small part of a very generalized system of such activities, since the
impunity index in Mexico is one of the highest in the world (Le Clercq
and Rodriguez 2017).
Both the ABC fire and the Cananea spill represent significant
catastrophic events for Sonora that drew considerable attention from
citizens and the press. The former caused many in the city to question
the safety of day care centers and the local political system that had
permitted local elites to profit from the privatization of child care. For
the parents and many others in the city, this was a direct abrogation
of responsibility on the part of the government. The spill—while it
did not directly kill anyone immediately—left an entire region of the
state doubting its future. Mining is a major activity along the Ŕıo
Sonora, and, if this mine, that had been cited for infractions in the
past, could get away with a slap on the wrist, it proved to many
citizens that neither PRI nor PAN could protect their interests.19 To
paraphrase Emiliano Ruiz Parra, official impunity is “poisoning the
social fabric” of Mexico (Rea 2015, 13).
The state is not monolithic and can be composed of a variety of
competing agendas, perhaps including some that are pushing for
more substantive positive change and not just giving cover to elites
and political machines. The neoliberal agendas of PRI and PAN
indeed do receive pushback from some cities, state agencies, and
federal offices (in addition to social movements against neoliber-
alism)—and we would like to think that multi-party democracies help
keep impunity in check. However, the ethics of impunity in this
setting are well developed. Victim groups play into this impunity by
19. One series of stories demonstrated how high-ranking officials and members
of the oligarchy had built dams or expropriated water from the Ŕıo Sonora or its
tributaries without seeking or receiving the appropriate permits. One rancher was
found to have constructed a major dam over 180 meters wide and 80 meters tall across
a tributary for the purposes of irrigating his stand of pecan trees.
Jones, Luque, Murphy, Recovering Impunity 243
seeking public authority, legitimacy in the eyes of the state, and even
belonging (e.g., Lund 2006).20
It would be hard to argue there were winners in the case of the
ABC fire, unless you included the lawyers who are making money and
reputations from the event, or perhaps, to a very minor degree, the
funerary, memorial and poster/printing industries. In the case of the
Cananea spill, there were clearly some who benefited via the likes of
disaster capitalism from the remediation actions by Grupo México
and the government. These were primarily those who supplied the
trucks and drivers who provided temporary drinking water to the
region and—to a very small degree and only temporarily—those who
provided lodging, food and fuel to short-term relief workers. While
wealthier landowners received much greater compensation, many of
them were impacted at least indirectly by the Cananea spill’s negative
effect on local product sales. The loss of trust in government gener-
ated new state leadership following both disasters. While this appears
to be a corrective action that punishes politicians, the major winner
was the established socio-political system, which was able, in the end,
to divert attention away from itself and its failings and onto negative
characteristics of those most hurt by the disasters.
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Araújo, Pedro. Towards a Sociology of Disasters: The Quiet Power of the
Indifferent State in the Entre-os-Rios Tragedy. University of Coimbra:
School of Arts and Humanities and Center for Social Studies, 2014.
Barrios, Roberto E. “‘Here, I’m not at Ease’: Anthropological Perspectives on
Community Resilience.” Disasters 38, no. 2 (2014): 329350.
Bates, Frederick L. Recovery, Change and Development: A Longitudinal
Study of the 1976 Guatemalan Earthquake. New York: Bantam, 1982.
Bernal, Victoria. “Colonial Moral Economy and the Discipline of
Development: The Gezira Scheme.” Cultural Anthropology 12, no. 4
(1997): 447–479.
Birkland, Thomas A. “Disasters, Focusing Events, and Sociolegal Studies.”
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Le Clercq, Juan, and Gerardo Rodŕıguez “Global Impunity Dimensions.
Global Impunity Index (GII-2017),” Fundación Universidad de las
Américas: Puebla, México, 2017.
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